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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JERRY WEAVER, d/b/a
REALEX REALTY,

/

Plaintiff and
Appellant,

/

vs.

/

LAWRENCE R. MODULA and
LANA G. MODULA,

/

Defendants and
Respondents.

Case No. 14597

/

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by the Appellant, who was
the Plaintiff in the Lower Court/ seeking to obtain a commission
for the alleged sale of the home of the Respondents/ who were
the Defendants in the Lower Court, as well as attorney's fees
alleged required to be expended by the Appellant by reason
of the action in the Lower Court and wherein the Respondents
have filed a Counterclaim in the Lower Court seeking to recover
from the Plaintiff the losses resulting to the Defendants by.
reason of the failure of the consummation of a sale of the

home undertaken by the Plaintiff, including the expenditure
of attorney's fees made by the Respondents and Counterclaimants
by reason of the failure of the sale of Respondents' home.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Lower Court dismissed the Appellant's cause of action
and held for the Respondents on their Counterclaim.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Respondents seek affirmation of the Judgment of
the Lower Court rendered in favor of the Respondents.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Respondents were desirous of selling their old home
in order to build a new home/ and prior to entering into a
brokerage contract with the Appellant/ advised the Appellant
that the Respondents would need all of the equity that they
could get out of their old home in order to have sufficient
money to purchase land and build a new home. (R-101)

The Respondent

advised the Appellant/ that they would accept nothing but cash
for their equity and were interested only in obtaining qualified
buyers, and the Respondents have testified that the Appellant
stated that, "I'll bring only qualified buyers". (R-102]
That on April 12, 1974/ a Sales Agency Contract was entered
-2-

into, wherein the Respondents were the sellers and the Appellant,
as a real estate broker, was the sales agent of the Respondents
and agreed at that time by the terms of the contract to obtain
a price of $38,900.00 on behalf of the Respondents and the
agreement provided:
During the life of this contract, if you find a
party who is ready, able, and willing to buy,
lease, or exchange said property, or any part
thereof, *** I agree to pay you a commission of
6 percent of such sale, lease, or exchange.
(Def.Exh.3) (Emphasis Added)
The Respondents testified that they believed that the condition
of the sale of the listing for sale was that the person would
be "qualified to purchase the home at that price" (R-102).
On July 20, 1974, an Earnest Money Agreement was entered
into by and between the Respondents and Mr. and Mrs. Stephens
as the buyers and who will be referred to herein as buyers,
wherein they agreed to purchase the home for $39,900.00 with
$500.00 down, leaving a balance of $39,400.00 to be paid October 1,
1974, and the buyers obtaining a conventional loan of 95 percent,
providing for the sellers to pay buyers closing costs, appraisal
fees, taxes, and insurance reserves, providing further for
the delivery of the final contract on August 16, 1974, buyers
to pay the sum of $368.00 monthly until the closing out of
the Earnest Money Agreement by a conventional loan payment by
-3-

the buyers.

The real estate broker listed on the Earnest Money

Receipt and Offer to Purchase being the Appellant herein. (Def.Exh.
10)
The Respondents entered into the Earnest Money Agreement
on the representation by the Appellant, that buyers had $500.00
to put down and that they could buy out the Respondentsl entire
equity in accordance with the Agreement entered into. (R-104)
The original Agreement of July 20 was entered into by
and between the Respondents and the buyers through the efforts
of the Appellant and provided for no stipulation that the Respondent
would carry any part of their equity on a contract but that
they would be paid out entirely (R-105).
On August 10, 1974, a second Earnest Money Receipt and
Offer to Purchase was submitted by the Appellant to the Respondents
when said buyers made an offer of $39,900.00 with a total downpayment/ including the earnest money deposit, of $2,000.00, including
the closing costs, providing for the obtaining by the buyers
of a conventional loan, to which the Respondents made a counteroffer providing for a sale price in the amount of $38,900.00,
and specifically stating that the seller (the Respondents)
would not carry the total contract and that the buyer was to
obtain financing immediately with the sellers carrying up to
$2,000.00 of the contract at $75.00 a month and at a rate of 9-1/2
-4-

percent interest, and further providing that if the buyers
wish to pay their own closing costs, that the price would be
$37,900.00 and the seller would carry $3,000.00 of the contract.
This earnest money counter-offer was accepted by the Respondents
and the buyer on August 13, 1974 (Def.Exh.ll). (Emphasis Added)
At the time that the Respondents entered into the Earnest
Money Agreement on August 13, 1974, the Respondents advised
the Appellant, who was the real estate agent and broker of
the Respondents, that the Earnest Money Agreement presented
on behalf of the buyers was going to create a hardship on the
Respondents because the money which was to be obtained from
the sale as the equity of the Respondents, was going to be
needed to buy a new home and that the Respondents needed all
of the equity, "everything I can get out of the home" (R-105),
and the Appellant responded that if Respondents would carry
the small amount of the equity of the Respondents as set forth
in the Contract of August 13, 1974, it would guarantee and
expedite the obtaining of a loan by the buyers. (R-106)
On August 17, 1974, the Appellant approached the Respondents
and proposed a third Earnest Money Agreement providing for
the Respondents to carry a contract balance in the sum of $5,900.00
at 9-3/4 percent interest, the Appellant advising the Respondents,
that such an agreement to carry a part of the equity would
-5-

guarantee the buyers obtaining a loan (R-106).

The Respondents

thereupon entered into a new Earnest Money Agreement on August 17,
1974, providing for a total selling price of $38/900.00 with
$2,000.00 as earnest money and downpayment and the Deed would
be delivered on August 29, 1974, and providing for monthly
installments to be paid by the buyers to the Respondents of
the sum of $440.00 monthly until the buyers had obtained their
financing and make arrangements for the closing of the loan.
The Earnest Money Agreement was subscribed to by the Respondents
and the buyers and also was signed by the Appellant as the
real estate broker. (Def.Exh.2)
On August 23, 1974, the Appellant advised the Respondents,
that the buyers wanted to move into the home before the start
of the school year, which was on August 26, 1974, and that
the Appellant felt that the loan was secure, that there should
be no problems and that the buyers would not back out of the
purchase of the home if they could get in before the school
year. (R-107)
Respondents agreed to move out providing that the buyers
would come up with the downpayment when the loan was closed
out at Security Title Company.

The Appellant advised the Respondent

that this was only a temporary matter and in approximately
thirty days the buyer would obtain his loan and that the Clearfield
-6-

State Bank had the funds and that there it was only necessary
to wait until the Loan Officer return from vacation and that
the loan was "pretty well guaranteed". (R-107,R-108)
In reliance upon the representations made by the Appellant,
the Respondents moved out of their home on August 24, 1974,
and the buyers moved into the home.

At which time, only the

Earnest Money Agreement had been signed and the closing of
the Uniform Real Estate Contract was to take place at Security
Title Company on August 27, 1974. (R-108)
Prior to the closing of the sale of the property and
entering into a Uniform Real Estate Contract, the Respondents
were assured by the Plaintiff, in a conversation which occurred
at the premises of the Security Title Company in Farmington,
wherein the Appellant assured the Respondents, that the buyers
should receive their loan in approximately thirty days. (R109)

The Respondent stated that he was told by the Appellant,

that the arrangement was only temporary, in that "approximately
thirty days they (the buyers) should receive their loan", and
the Respondent further testified that he would not have signed
the Uniform Real Estate Contract had he known that he was not
going to get the equity money from the buyers. (R-109)
The Uniform Real Estate Contract was entered into August 27,
1974, between the Respondents and the buyers in the presence
-7-

of the Appellant and provided for the sale of the home for
a price of $38,900.00, and further provided for a downpayment
in the amount of $1,951.95 with the buyer paying payments to
Security Title Company in the amount of $440.00 monthly, commencing
October 1, 1974, with said payment including interest, principal,
taxes, and fire insurance premiums.

The buyers agreeing to

obtain a conventional loan as soon as possible and the sellers
agreeing to assume and pay all expenses necessary and incidental
in obtaining the loan, and further providing that the Uniform
Real Estate Contract was subject to an existing lien and encumbrance
of Clearfield State Bank due and owing thereon in the sum of
$22,699.72. (Def.Exh.l)
The escrow and closing statement of Security Title Company
evidenced a payment deducted from the cash downpayment paid
to sellers in the amount of $250.00 for the mortgage payment
for August to Clearfield State Bank; the sum of $139.00 for
title insurance; a sales commission of $2,274.00 to be paid to
Appellant; closing costs in the amount of $34.00; all to be
paid by Respondents.

The Respondents receiving a net remittance

from the downpayment in the sum of $1,681.00 with the sales
commission being deferred. (Def.Exh.4)
In the closing statement, there was no provision made
for payments of any monies out of the agreed monthly installment
-8-

of $440.00 to be paid monthly by buyers for payment to the
broker (Appellant) as and for sales commission on the sale
of the property (Def.Exh.4).

Security Title Company did, however,

pay to the Appellant the sum of $286.00 as part of Appellant's
sales commission. (R-121)
The Respondents telephoned the Appellant approximately
fifteen times and held conversations as to Respondents concerning finalizing the sale and obtaining their equity. (R-118)
The Appellant continually reassuring the Respondents, that
money was difficult to obtain, but advising the Respondents
in the latter part of September and early part of October,
1974, that the loan could only be obtained by the buyers for
approximately $31,000.00 (R-122) and the Respondents then realized
for the first time, that "things were looking grim". (R-123)
Upon the Appellant suggesting to the Respondents, that
they should agree to a loss of points by accepting an F.H.A.
loan by discounting the sale by $1,500.00 or more, the Respondents
then were aware that there was no longer a sale and that the
buyer was not a qualified and able buyer and could not qualify
for a conventional loan. (R-119)
The Respondent received monthly payments in the amount
of $250.00 on October 31, 1974, and $250.00 on November 27,
1974, which evidenced that from the $440.00 paid by the buyers
-9-

on monthly installments to Security Title Company, that $143.00
was paid to Realex Realty, which is the company of the Appellant,
each month, and that payments of $46.00 were paid towards the
title insurance and $1.00 for escrow fee, leaving a net on
each of the two checks in the amount of $250.00, which amount
represented the payment on Clearfield State Bankfs secured
lien so that the Respondents received no monies from the $440.00
a month payments made for the months of October and November
by the buyers. (Def.Exh.9)

No other mortgage payments were

made by the buyer nor received by the Respondents, other than
the money set forth in Defendants1 Exhibit 9 above. (R-149)
On October 18, 1974, the Respondent wrote a letter to
Security Title advising Security Title not to pay other deductions from the amounts to be paid by the buyer and that, other
than deduction of the $46.33 in accordance with the closing
statement, agreed upon and which sets forth the handling of
the funds to be made by Security Title, that the balance of
the money in the amount of $393.67 must be turned over to the
Respondents, who would then apply all of the funds to the balance
due and owing to Clearfield State Bank. (Pl.Exh.l)
On November 8, 1974, Attorney Pete N. Vlahos, as Attorney
for the Respondents, advised the buyers that the sellers had
been advised by Mr. Weaver, that the loan would be secured
by the buyers on or about the 1st day of October, and based
-10-

upon that representation, the home was sold and making demand
upon the buyers to make immediate application for a loan pursuant
to the Uniform Real Estate Contract, and that unless the loan
was completed no later then December 15, that legal action
would be taken against the buyers and the Appellant for the
numerous representations made and the failure of the buyers
to perform in accordance with their agreement. (Def.Exh.5)
On November 7, 1974, the Respondents sent a communication
to the Appellant, advising that Respondents were induced to
enter into an agreement to carry a part of the contract in
the amount of $5,900.00, in that the buyers had qualified for
a 9-3/4 percent loan and could only qualify for a $31,000.00
to $32,000.00 (R-133,R-53), and the Respondent further stated:
I feel you have not protected my interests as you
said you would and also I will notify Mr. Stephens
of this action for this has been dragging on since
late July. As per my letter to Mr. Stephens of
September 16, 1974, I stated that thirty days from
that date the loan should be obtained, but have
received nothing but static over it. (R-53)
Mrs. Modula, one of the Respondents, corroborated the
testimony of her spouse in affirming that in the conversation
held with the Appellant prior to listing with the Appellant,
that he was advised of the purpose of the sale of the home
being for the Respondents to get all of their equity and that
they would desire to be involved only with qualified buyers,
-11-

to which the Appellant agreed prior to the entering into of
a brokerage agreement between the Respondents and the Appellant•
(R-142,R-143)
The buyers called the Respondents and advised that they
could not continue making payments of $440.00 a month (R-176),
and upon the failure of the buyers to obtain a loan, an Accord
and Satisfaction was entered into by and between the Respondents
and the buyers, wherein the buyers removed themselves from
the premises and the property of the sellers, and upon the
sellers, the Respondents herein, returning to the buyers the
sum of $1,500.00.

The agreement was subscribed to on December 17,

1974, (Def.Exh.8) and subsequent thereto, the buyers moved
to Arizona. (R-167)
The present action before the Court was commenced when
the Appellant brought an action against the Respondents seeking
to collect his commissions upon the real estate sale that never
matured and for which the Respondents refunded the buyers most
of the monies paid in by the buyers.

The Appellant seeking

to recover the sum of $1,988.00, having already received the
sum of $286.00, making an alleged brokerage and sales fee to
the Appellant claimed due and owing in the amount of $2,274.00,
and in addition to which the Appellant sought the highest legal
rate of interest from August 27, 1974, plus attorney's fees
-12-

and costs of Court. (R-l and 2)
The decision of the Lower Court as set forth in the
Memorandum by the Court awarded a Judgment to the Respondents
basing the Judgment upon the Sales Agency Contract entered
into as between the Respondents and the Appellant and providing
for the Appellant finding a buyer who was ready, able, and
willing to purchase (emphasis by Court); the Court finding
from the evidence before the Court and the record, that there
was no money available for a straight mortgage; and that the
buyer was not able to obtain financing (Court's emphasis);
the Court setting forth that the Plaintiff entered into the
final Earnest Money Agreement on the basis that the buyer would
obtain immediate financing and that the Appellant was aware
that the Defendants needed their equity out of the home and
that obtaining that equity was part of the Appellant's and
Respondents' agreement; that the Appellant was aware, or should
have been aware, of the money situation and of the buyer's
inability to obtain a straight financing; finding that the
final contract entered into as between the Respondents and
the buyer providing for a high monthly payment was only a temporary
thing and was entered into based upon the buyer obtaining a
loan to finance the purchase of the equity of the Respondents,
and the further finding of the Court, that the Appellant breached
-13-

its fiduciary and agency relationship with the Respondents
and in making full disclosure to the Respondents of information
within the knowledge of the Appellant* (R-87,-88,-89)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE APPELLANT BREACHED HIS DUTY TO RESPONDENTS IN FAILING
TO FIND A QUALIFIED BUYER ABLE TO PURCHASE PROPERTY.
The Sales Agency Contract entered into by and between
the Appellant with the Respondents provided specifically the
finding of a party who is "ready, able, and willing to buy".
(Def.Exh.3)

In the case of Crampton v. Irwin, 203 P. 672,

the Supreme Court of Colorado, Jan., 1922, the Court held that
in a suit by a broker for a commission for procuring a purchaser,
that it is not necessary to show the financial ability of the
purchaser, but the right to recovery is controlled by the rule
that when a sale of land does not take place, that the broker
cannot recover a commission unless the broker alleges and proves
that he produced a person ready, willing, and able to purchase
the property on the terms and conditions on which he was authorized
to negotiate a sale.
The Appellant, after supposedly having qualified the
Stephens as buyers, presented an Earnest Money Receipt and
Offer to Purchase on July 20, 1974, for a price of $39,900.00,
-14-

setting forth that the buyers would obtain a conventional loan
in the amount of 95 percent of the gross sales, less the earnest
money of $500.00, and the contract was never performed by the
buyers (Def.Exh.10); approximately twenty days later on August 10,
1974, the Appellant brought an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer
to Purchase from the same buyers setting forth the same purchase
price and providing for a payment of $2,000.00 down, providing
for monthly installments of $365.00 and for the seller to carry
the contract until the buyer would be able to obtain financing,
to which the Respondents did not agree and made a counter-offer
which was subscribed to and accepted by the buyer for the sale
of the property at a lesser sum, namely the amount of $38,900.00
and providing for the buyer to obtain financing "immediately"
and providing for the seller to carry up to $2,000.00 on the
contract at $75.00 a month, with the seller carrying $3,000.00,
providing that the buyer paid all of the closing costs (Def.Exh.ll);
subsequently seven days later on August 17, 1974, the Appellant
offered an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase from
the same buyer setting forth the price of $38,900.00 with a
$2,000.00 downpayment and providing for the buyers to obtain
a conventional loan as soon as possible, and providing for
the sellers to carry a contract of $5,900.00 as part of the
downpayment, with monthly payments of $440.00 to be made by
-15-

the buyers to the sellers until the loan had been arranged
(Def.Exh.2)/ based upon the representations made by the Appellant,
that the buyers would qualify for a $31,000.00 to $32,000.00
loan and would be able to close the deal out within thirty
days. (R-106)
The Respondents relied upon the representations made
by the buyers and the affirmation of the Appellant/ that the
loan would be consummated as soon as an officer of the Clearfield
State Bank returned from vacation (R-107,-108), and believing
the representation did then enter into a Uniform Real Estate
Contract on August 27, 1974, which both the Respondents and
the buyer believed only to be a temporary matter, in that the
buyers could not afford to pay $440.00 a month for an indefinite
period of time. (R-167)
In Reynor v. Mackrill, 164 N.W. 335, the Supreme Court
of Iowa (Oct., 1917), defined an able purchaser as follows:
To be able means that the purchaser must have the
money at the time to make any cash payments that
are required in order to meet the terms of the seller
and does not simply mean that the purchaser have
property upon which he could raise the amount if
necessary; but, as stated, he must actually have the
money to meet the cash payment and be in shape
financially to meet any deferred payments.
1 A.L.R. 528-532 is an annotation on what constitutes
ability to pay within rule as to brokerage right to commission
-16-

and clearly illustrates that in accordance with the facts heretofore
set forth in this Brief, that the buyer was not an able and
willing buyer and that the broker, the Appellant herein, should
have reasonably known that the buyer would not qualify as an
able buyer, and furthermore, the Statement of Facts set forth
herein before show a continuous substitution of Earnest Money
Agreements made by the Appellant, clearly evidencing the inability
of the buyers to be able to enter into a loan and evidences
that the Appellant was only seeking to maneuver himself into
a position of collecting a commission rather than obtaining
a real buyer able and willing to deal with the Respondents.
In Pellatun v. Brunski, 231 P. 583, District Court of
Appeals of California (Oct., 1924), the Court defined the word
"able", meaning financially able, stated:
This rule, however, does not mean that such purchaser
must have all the money in his immediate possession
or to his credit at a bank, but only that he must be
able to command the necessary funds to close the deal
within the time required.
In Robertson v. Allen, 184 Fed. 372, 107 C C A . 254,
the Court held that:
A proposed purchaser cannot, therefore, be said to
be able to purchase when he is dependent upon third
parties, who are in no way bound to furnish the funds
to make such purchase.
The evidence in the instant matter before this Court
shows that the Appellant informed the Respondents, that the
-17-

buyers had $2,500.00 put down as a downpayment for the purchase
of the property (R-173), but that the Appellant had been told
by the buyers that it would be necessary for them to borrow
$2,000.00 from the parents of Mr. Stephens in order to obtain
a $2,500.00 downpayment (R-173), which information was not
given to the Respondents timely tR-174,R-175).
In Johns v. Ambrose-Williams & Company, 317 P.2d 897,
Supreme Court of Colorado (1957), the Court stated:
This Court has repeatedly held that in these real
estate commission cases, the broker, to sustain
an action for commission, must do so by testimony
that is clear and convincing, and we still adhere
to that as a correct rule in such cases, and the
reason for such rule cannot better be expressed
than in one of the earliest decisions of our
Court of Appeals, Babcock v. Merritt, 1 Colo.App.
84, 27 P. 882, which is stated as follows: "The
law should be so defined and construed as to
afford the owner of property some protection against
the persistent claims of brokers who seek the recovery on purely technical grounds, and at the
same time, assure to the broker compensation for
services honestly and actually rendered."
In Hiniger v. Judy, 398 P.2d 305, Supreme Court of Kansas
(Jan., 1965), the Court defined the Rule of Law as to when
a broker is entitled to a commission by setting forth the following
The general rule is that a real estate agent or
broker is entitled to a commission if (a) he
produces a buyer who is able, ready, and willing
to purchase upon the profferred terms or upon
terms acceptable to the principal; (b) he is
the efficient and procuring cause of a consummated
deal.
-18-

In Dobbs v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528, 236 A.2d 843, 30 A.L.R.3rd
1370, (New Jersey Supreme Court, Dec. 18, 1967), the Supreme
Court held that in order for a seller to be liable for the
commission of a broker, that the following must be proven:
(1)

That a court must read into every real estate brokerage

agreement or contract of sale a requirement that, barring default
by the seller, a commission shall not be deemed earned against
the seller unless the contract of sale is performed, and that
when there is substantial inequality of bargaining power, position,
or advantage in the broker's favor, any provision to the contrary
in an agreement prepared, presented, negotiated, or procured
by the broker shall be deemed unenforceable.
(2)

That as a matter of law, in the instant case, the

owners were not liable to Plaintiff for the commission specified
in the unconsummated contract of sale, since the buyer and
owners had been brought together by Plaintiff and the failure
to close title was due entirely to the buyer's financial incapacity
to perform.
(3)

That when a prospective buyer solicits a broker

to find or show him property which he might be interested in
buying, and the broker finds property satisfactory to him which
the owner agrees to sell at the price offered, and the buyer
knows that the broker will earn a commission for the sale from
-19-

the owner, the law will imply a promise on the part of the
buyer to complete the transaction with the owner, and the buyer f s
failure or refusal to do so, without valid reason, renders
him liable to the broker for breach of the implied promise***.
In Winkelman v. Allen, 519 P.2d 1377, Supreme Court
of Kansas (Mar., 1974), the Court defined what it considers
as the meaning of a purchaser of real estate financially ready
and able to buy when it stated the following necessary conditions:
(1)

If he has the needed cash in his hand, or

(2)

If he is personally possessed of assets - which

in part may consist of a property to be purchased - and a credit
rating which enables him with reasonable certainty to command
the requisite funds at the required time, or
(3)

If he has definitely arranged to raise the necessary

money - or as much thereof as he is unable to supply personally
- by obtaining a binding committment for a loan to him for
that purpose by a financially able third party.
The Court further stated that in order for a real estate
broker to be entitled to a commission for producing a purchaser
"able, ready, and willing" to purchase the property, that:
The broker has the obligation to inquire into the
prospect's financial status and to establish his
adequacy to fulfill the monetary conditions of the
purchase. With this burden cast upon the real
estate broker, the owner may accept the prospective
-20-

customer without being obligated to make an independent inquiry into his financial capacity, and
the owner is not estopped to assert lack of financial
capacity on the part of the prospective customer
simply because he "accepted" the buyer in the course
of negotiations.
The findings of the Lower Court in its Memorandum Decision
by the specific finding that the buyer was not "able" to obtain
financing; that the Plaintiff (Appellant) was aware that the
Respondents needed their equity out of their home and the obtaining
of that equity was part of the Appellant's and Respondents1
agreement? and further, that the Appellant was aware, or should
have been aware, of the money situation and of the buyer's
inability to obtain straight financing. (R-87)
POINT II
APPELLANT HAD DUAL CAPACITY OF AGENT WITH FIDUCIARY
OBLIGATIONS TO RESPONDENTS.
The Appellant testified that he was a real estate broker
for Realex Realty (R-152) and that he entered into an agreement
with the Respondents for the listing of the Respondents' home
and for the sale of their home (R-153).
On April 14, 1974, the Appellant entered into a Sales
Agency Contract with the Respondents as broker and agent for
the sale of the home and real property at 1287 Marilyn, Syracuse,
Utah, for the sale of the home at a price of $38,900.00 and
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providing for a conventional loan showing an existing mortgage
on behalf of Clearfield State Bank of Clearfield, Utah, with
a balance thereon in the amount of $22,800 .00. (Def.Exh.3)
The Sales Agency Contract provided that the broker, the Appellant
herein, was to find a party ready, able, and willing to buy
and was advised by the Respondents, that the purpose of selling
the home was to obtain the cash equity out of the home that
belonged to the Respondents, in that they desired to build
a new home and needed the equity in order to acquire land and
build the new home, which they intended to acquire by the sale
of the existing home. (R-101)
The Appellant brought an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer
to Purchase to the Respondents on July 20, 1974, wherein the
Stephens were the buyers and wherein a purchase price of $39,900.00
was set forth with $500.00 down and the balance to be financed
by a conventional loan of 95 percent, to which the buyers and
the Respondents agreed and signed same. CDef.Exh.10)
Approximately twenty days later on August 10, 1974,
the Appellant brought another Earnest Money Receipt and Offer
to Purchase to the Respondents providing for a downpayment
of $2,000.00 against the purchase price of $39,900.00 and seller
to carry the contract until the buyer is able to obtain financing,
and specifically providing for conventional financing, to which
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a counter-offer was made by the Respondents to sell the home
for $38,900,00, and specifically provided that the seller would
not carry the contract and that the buyer would obtain financing
immediately and that the seller would carry up to $2,000.00
on the contract at a specific monthly amount and interest rate
on the contract.
Appellant on August 17, 1974, brought another Earnest
Money Agreement to the Respondents concerning the same buyers
and provided therein, that for a total purchase price of $38,900.00
with a $2,000.00 downpayment and for the Respondents to carry
a contract balance in the amount of $5,900.00 (Def. Exh.2).
Appellant at that time advised the Respondents, that he had
a lender who would loan $31,000.00 to $32,000.00 and that the
deal would be closed within thirty days (R-118,-119).
The Appellant further advised the Respondent, that the
buyers wanted to move into the home before the start of the
school year, which was August 26, and he believed that the
loan was secure and that there would be no problems, and upon
that representation, the Respondents moved out of their home
(R-107).

Following the signing of the Earnest Money Agreement

on August 17, the Respondents relying upon the qualification
of the Stephens as an able and willing buyer entered into a
Uniform Real Estate Contract, in that they had no other choice
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in that they had moved out of their home and had turned possession
of the home over to the alleged buyers and having expended
monies in their new premises, which although temporary were
intended to be used until they would buy and build their new
home. (R-123)
The Appellant knew that the buyers had only been a few
months in the area (R-166); that although the buyers told the
Appellant that they were looking for a home in a range of approximately $300.00 a month (R-167)/ that the temporary agreement
of $440.00 a month was entered as the amount to be paid monthly
by the buyers; that the buyers, in fact, did not have $2,500.00
to pay as a downpayment but had only $500.00 and would have
had to borrow the $2,000.00 from their parents in order to
be able to make a downpayment in excess of the $500.00 (R173); that the Appellant had contacted a large number of institutioi
all of whom had rejected the loan (R-161); that in fact the
buyer did move out of the State not long after the Respondents
had returned to the buyers the $1,500.00 of their downpayment
(R-167); that Zions Bank had advised the Appellant, that they
were making no loans whatsoever on any real estate deal even
with 25 percent down (R-1841; all of which information was
not revealed by the Appellant to the Respondents nor were they
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advised thereof.

That the Appellant did not consider himself

as the exclusive agent of the Respondents, nor did the Appellant
consider himself as being the fiduciary of the Respondents
when in answer to questions and use of "we"/ the Appellant
stated:
I would say that as things progress, while we
did look at it, we all agree, and I might clarify
it that when I say "we", it is myself, it's
Mr. Modula, it's Mr. Stephens. Really, I was
the agent for Mr. Modula in trying to work his
interest and trying to work Mr. Stephens interest,
so that they were both happy, and eventually,
this is what it turned out to. (R-155) ***And
then, as we progressed down along the same line,
the same comments were brought up at Security
Title and they (the Respondents) wanted Mr. Gurr
to put this exact date in there; and, of course,
Mr. Stephens, he just couldn't accept this type
of a situation. I couldn't recommend that he
get into that situation. (R-156)
In further regard to the Appellant's attitude of his
relationship as between the Respondents as the sellers, himself
as a real estate broker, and the buyers, the following Interrogatory was asked by the attorney for the Respondents and replied
to by the Appellant as follows:
Q.

You knew if you were acting in your fiduciary capacity,

that your responsibility was to the sellers; wasn't it?
had no obligation to the buyers?

You

Your's was to the sellers;

they were paying you the commission; they were the ones that
had given you specific instructions; isn't that a fair statement,
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Mr. Weaver?
A.

Well, not completely.

It's true that I have a fiduciary

relationship, and I work for the sellers, and working for the
sellers I also have to work for the buyers.

And so I have

to really serve both people. (R-169,R-170)
In Reese v. Harper, 8 Ut.2d 119, 329 P.2d 410, the Supreme
Court of Utah (Sept., 1958), the question arose as to the nature
and extent of the duty which a real estate agent owes to his
principal and whether or not the Plaintiff discharged it.
Mr. Harper was the seller and engaged the services of Mr. Reese
for the sale of a farm, and asked that a buyer be found to
purchase the property of Mr. Harper, wherein a $45,000.00 price
was set by the seller as the value he wished to receive.

Five

days after the agency agreement, the agent proposed to the
seller a deal with a buyer for the property to be sold for
$30,000.00 and evidencing that there should be no encumbrances
upon the sale of the property.

The seller signed an Earnest

Money Agreement to that affect and believed that the obligations
which the seller had as encumbrances against the property in
the amount of $15,000.00 would be paid by the buyer, and that
the $30,000.00 represented the net amount to be paid to the
seller.

This would have given the seller approximately $45,000.00

that they were asking.

When the seller made a final determin-

ation, that the $30,000.00 offer was not exclusive of the payment
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of the encumbrances owed, but that same would be deducted from
the amount, refused to sign the agreement and thereafter the
broker filed suit against the seller for a commission on the
sale of the property which had not been consummated.
The Utah Supreme Court held that:
The above contention is sound as between people
dealing with each other under usual circumstances*
But the relationship of real estate agent and client
makes the situation quite different. The agent is
issued a license and permitted to hold himself out
to the public as qualified by training and experienced
to render a specialized service in a field of real
estate transactions. There rests upon him the
responsibility of honestly and fairly representing
the interest of those who engage his services, and
upon failing to do so his license may be revoked.
Accordingly, persons who entrust their business to
such agents are entitled to repose some degree of
confidence that they will be loyal to such trust,
and that they will, with reasonable diligence and
in good faith, represent the interests of their
client. Unless the law demands this standard,
instead of being the badge of competence and integrity it is supposed to be, the license would serve
only as a foil to lure the unsuspecting public in
to be duped by people more skilled and experienced
in such affairs than are they, when they would be
better off taken care of such business for themselves.
The Court then stated the Rule:
Because of the specialized service the real estate
broker offers in acting as an agent for his client,
there arises a fiduciary relationship between them;
it is incumbent upon him to apply his abilities
and knowledge to the advantage of the man he
serves; and to make full disclosure of all facts
which his principal should know in transacting
the business. Failure to discharge such duty
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with reasonable diligence and care precludes his
recovery for the service he purports to be
rendering.
The Court further observed that the broker was not dischargee
in duty, in that he had not explained the contract to his client
nor called to the client's attention the variance in the terms,
and upon suit of the broker for his commission/ the Court held:
Under these circumstances/ it was the duty of
the agent to disclose to his principal the vast
differences in the terms***. This duty was not
discharged by simply handing to the owner an
unsigned contract***. It was his duty to inform
his principal of all facts which might influence
his principal in accepting or rejecting the
offer. An agent is not entitled to recover until
he has fully performed this duty***.
In the instant matter before the Court, the Appellant
herein appeared to be acting on the presumption that he was
a fiduciary and an agent of both the seller and the buyer,
and the Appellant did not reveal information which was made
known to the Appellant which would have prevented the Respondents
from suffering the time and loss of money which they suffered/
and specifically/ the Appellant had not continuously informed
the Respondents of the inability of the buyer to be able to
complete the transactions of the purchase of the property of
the Respondents/ and that the buyer, even if it can be conceded
that he was willing, was not an "able" buyer.
In Morley v. J. Pagel Realty and Insurance, 550 P.2d
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1104, the Court of Appeals of Arizona (June, 1976).

The Court

defined a duty of a real estate broker by reaffirming a previous
decision of the Arizona Supreme Court in stating:
The real estate agent owes a duty of utmost good
faith and loyalty to the principal, and one
employed to sell property has the specific duty
of exercising reasonable due care and diligence
to effect a sale to the best advantage of the
principal - that is, on the best terms and at the
best price possible. ***He is also under a duty
to disclose to his client information he possesses
pertaining to the transaction in question.
At the time of the entering into the last Earnest Money
Agreement and the subsequent Uniform Real Estate Contract,
the Appellant was well aware that the arrangement by the buyer
to pay $440.00 a month was an arrangement that the buyer did
not desire to continue, but was only a temporary arrangement
until a loan was arranged, and further, the Appellant knew
that it was not the intent, at any time, of the Respondents
to carry the entire contract balance and continued to receive
the monthly installments without the Respondents being paid
for at least the remainder of their cash equity between the
amount that the Respondents agreed to carry and the difference
between the mortgage lien of Clearfield State Bank and the
amount remaining would have been available to the Respondents
for the purpose of buying a lot and constructing their new
home, and that under no circumstances was the entering into
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of a Uniform Real Estate Contract final in accordance with
the desires and intent of either the Respondents or the buyers,
and that the subsequent necessity of the Respondents paying
back to the buyers $1,500.00 of their downpayment in order
to facilitate the buyers in removing themselves from the property
of the sellers, could not under any circumstances have been
a final sale so as to further encumber the Respondents with
a total 6-percent brokerage fee due and owing by the Respondents
to the Appellant for a sale of the property.
In Westco Realty, Inc., v. Drewry, 515 P.2d 513, Court
of Appeals of Washington, Sept., 1973, the Court stated:
It is true, that as a general rule, a real estate
broker becomes entitled to his commission as soon
as he procures a purchaser who is accepted by the
principal and with whom the principal enters into
a binding and enforceable contract. ** It is also
true, though, that this rule is not applicable
where the principal's acceptance of the purchaser
occurs under circumstances amounting to a breach
of a broker's duty of loyalty to his principal.
In 12 Am.Jur.2d, Brokers, Sec. 168 (1964), at page 909,
the rule is succinctly stated as follows:
A broker is not entitled to compensation if he
fails to disclose to his principal any personal
knowledge which he possesses relative to matters
which are or may be material to his employer's
interest, or if he acts adversely thereto, either
for the purpose of aiding another or with a design
of securing a secret profit for himself, or otherwise advancing his own welfare at the expense of
that of his employer. (Emphasis Added)
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In Hiniger v. Judy, supra, the Supreme Court of Kansas
held that:
That the primary relation as between customer and
real estate broker, is that of agency, the general
rules of law applicable to principal and agent
govern their rights and liabilities.
The Supreme Court of Kansas further stated:
Whether a broker has performed services entitling
him to a commission is ordinarily a question of
fact for the jury, if there is conflict in
evidence or if there is any substantial evidence
to support the essential elements of his cause of
action.
The matter presently before this Court was heard by
the Judge as a Trier of Facts and the Memorandum Decision of
the Court after hearing all of the testimony and weighing the
credibility of all witnesses found as follows:
The final contract, as entered into, called for exceptionally high payments that the Plaintiff alleged
was put in there so that the buyer would obtain
a loan. The Court finds that it was never the
intention of the buyer and the seller to enter
into the final contract as a final contract,
but that it was a temporary thing based upon
the buyer obtaining a loan and supplying the
seller with his equity. **The total transaction
from the beginning to the end was based upon the
buyer obtaining a loan whereby the seller would
obtain his equity from his property.
The Court finds that there was a fiduciary relationship between Plaintiff and Defendants which
required Plaintiff to make full disclosure of
all facts which his principal should know in
transacting the business between them; and if
the Defendants had been informed that there was
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a good chance that the buyer would be unable to
obtain financing because of the money situation,
the final offer would have been rejected and the
final contract would not have been entered into.
(R-87,R-88)
The Trier of Fact further found that:
It appears that the Plaintiff was primarily
interested in obtaining his commission and
allowing Defendants to enter into the final
contract under the belief, that the buyer was
an able buyer and would obtain financing, and
that the Plaintiff knew or should have known
that there was no money available in order for
the purchaser to complete the contract. (R-88)
In Rattray v. Scudder, 169 P.2d 371, the Supreme Court
of California (1946) , held that the duty imposed upon a real
estate agent is the same obligation of undivided service and
loyalty that it imposes upon a trustee in favor of his beneficiary.

The California Supreme Court further stated that an

agent is charged with a duty of fullest disclosure of all material
facts concerning the transaction that might affect the principal's
decision.
In Reich v. Christopulos, 256 P.2d 238, the Supreme
Court of Utah stated the rule of the duty of the agent and
broker by adopting the definition set forth in 4 Am.Jur., Brokers,
Section 142, page 1067, by quoting:
The faithful discharge of his duties is a condition
precedent to any recovery upon the part of the
broker for the services he has rendered to his
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principal, thus, he is not entitled to compensation if he fails to disclose to his principals
any personal knowledge which he possesses relative
to matters which are or may be material to his
employerf s interest* * *.
The Appellant in its Point II makes a general allegation,
that all of the testimony which was admitted in the Lower Court
without objection by either of the parties hereto, which defined
in general the state of mind and intent of the parties in entering
into the contract, is in some ways non-admissible evidence,
even though there had been no objection to same, and makes
objection now for the first time in the Brief of the Appellant
before this Court (Appellant's Brief, p. 10).
It is submitted to this Court, that in the case of Roungren
v. Lloyd Construction Company, 22 Ut.2d 207, 450 P.2d 985 (1969),
this Court stated:
**The Parol Evidence Rule, "while simple to state,
is often confusing in its application, due largely
to misunderstanding of its purposes; that is
attempting to apply a rule rather than a reason".
Consistent with that idea, that the Rule should
not be regarded as applicable in rigidity and
without exception, but in the light of reason
under the particular circumstances, is this thought
pertinent here: The fact that the parties have
a written contract on a subject does not prevent
them from entering into other agreements relating
to the same general subject matter.
The Appellant in an attempt to support his theory of
exclusion of Parol Evidence quoted from Ruff v. Boltz, 448
P.2d 549, 252 Or.2d 236 (1968) (Appellant's Brief, p. 16),
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however an examination of the case evidences that the Oregon
Court recognized an exception where there is an allegation
of fraud, and it is pointed out to the Court, that the Counterclaim
of the Respondents before the Court sets forth an allegation
of fraud and deceit (R-3 - 6), that the Oregon Court held,
that by the terms of the Parol Evidence Rule a showing of fraud
is an exception to the prohibition on the use of Parol Evidence
to vary a written contract.
The Appellant further cited in support of his position,
that he had not breached a fiduciary duty by failing to disclose
that there was no loan money available to purchaser, the case
of Martineau v. Hansen, 47 Ut. 549, 155 P. 432 (Appellant's
Brief, p. 17). The attention of the Court is called to the
specific exception to a broker being entitled to the commission
when the Court adopted the following citation from the Law
of Agency, and stated:
Yet, if the principal in accepting him (the
prospective purchaser) as a purchaser did not
rely on his own judgment, but rather upon that
of the broker, and the purchaser is not able
to comply with his contract, the broker would
not be entitled to commission; nor would he be
entitled to commissions if the ratification was
made on the strength of false statements made
by him.
It is submitted to the Court, that the Respondents herein
made no independent investigation whatsoever of the buyer,
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but relied solely upon the skill of the broker in qualifying
the prospective buyers, and in particular, the buyer involved
in this transaction, and that, therefore, the exception set
forth by this Court in the Martineau case, supra, is dispositive
of this issue.
POINT III
RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO RECOVER ALL DAMAGES
PROXIMATELY FLOWING FROM WRONGFUL ACTS OF APPELLANT.
The facts and the record before this Court are adequately
covered by the Memorandum Decision of the Lower Court, wherein
the Court found:
The obtaining of a title policy for purchaser who
is not an able buyer is an expense attributable
to the breach on Plaintiff's part. Defendants
are granted Judgment on their Counterclaim for
$286.00 for the commission paid, $190.00 for the
title policy and costs. Defendants are further
granted $500.00 attorney's fees for the defense
of this action. The granting of the attorney's
fees is based upon Plaintiff's insistence upon
attorney's fees under the agreement which fairness
in equity and due process would require said
provision to work both ways. (R-89)
It is submitted to this Court, that the action in the
Lower Court was brought by the Appellant in an attempt to recover
the total 6 percent on the selling price of the property in
the amount of $38,900.00, and that the Appellant sought in
its Complaint to recover the attorneyls fees and costs of Court.
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The Lower Court, sitting as a Court of equity as well
as law, gave equity to the Respondents by awarding to the Respondeni
the sum determined by the Court to be reasonable and which
was testified to by the Respondents as the amount agreed to be
paid to their attorney, namely the sum of $500.00, and it is
submitted to the Court, that the Judgment of the Court was
a fair and equitable award*
CONCLUSION
Respondents submit to this Honorable Court, that the
conclusions of the Lower Court are valid and uncontradictable,
that the Appellant undertook to find a buyer qualified and
able to purchase the home of the Respondents, and that the
buyer was not a qualified and able buyer, and that the obligation of the Appellant was that of one standing in a fiduciary
relationship to the Respondents, as well as the Appellant being
an agent of the Respondents, and that as such, the Appellant
did not make complete revelation of all pertinent and substantive facts known to the Appellant concerning the ability of
the buyer to be an able purchaser, and that the Appellant's
inducement of the Respondents to enter into a contract of sale,
which was never performed by the buyer and the consequent refund
of the buyer's downpayment and cancellation of the sale by
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the Respondents, was a proximate result of the breach of the
obligations of the Appellant in his fiduciary and agency capacity
to the Respondents; that the Respondents are further entitled
to recover the closing costs and brokerage fees paid by Respondents
and further, that the Appellant having sought by reason of
a contract in writing providing for attorney's fees to collect
same by initiating an action against the Respondents, that
the Respondents having been found by the Lower Court to be
the injured party should in equity receive the reasonable attorney's
fees resulting to the Respondents by reason of the action brought
by the Appellant in the Lower Court.
Respectfully submitted,

PETE N. VLAHOS
"
Attorney for Respondents
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